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1 Introduction
Client-to-client password-authenticated key exchange protocols (C2C-PAKE) are
important cryptographic techniques for secure communications. Conceptually, a
typical C2C-PAKE protocol works as follows. It is required that each client should
share a human-memorable password with his own trusted server. When two clients
want to establish a shared session key, they resort to their own trusted server for
authenticating each other. Therefore, a communicating party who wants to build
secure communications with other parties does not need to remember so many pass-
words whose number would be large linearly in the number of all possible partners,
instead it only holds a password shared with his trusted server. Due to this advan-
tage, it has attracted a lot of attention and many C2C-PAKE protocols have been
proposed [1,2,3,4,5,6,7] in recent years.
Byun et al. [1] ﬁrst proposed a C2C-PAKE protocol in the cross-realm setting by
using the key distribution centers(KDCs) in the diﬀerent realms as the go-between.
They have heuristically proved that the schemes were secure against all consid-
ered attacks. Such protocols are more popularly known as cross-realm C2C-PAKE
protocols. For simplicity, we will call these C2C-PAKEs for the rest of this paper.
Nevertheless, most of the existing C2C-PAKE protocols were only analyzed in
ad hoc without a formal security model. Hitherto, only Byun et al. [6] and Yin-Li
[7] respectively proposed provably secure C2C-PAKE protocols, with security based
on computationally intractable assumptions. However, Phan and Goi [8] found that
both protocols fall to undetectable online dictionary attacks by any adversary and
that the protocol of Byun et al. [6] can not keep the malicious servers from launching
a successful man-in-the-middle attack and the Yin-Li [7] scheme inherits a weakness
against unknown key-share attacks.
To our knowledge, there exists no generic construction of C2C-PAKE in the
cross-realm setting. Recently, Abdalla et al. [9] proposed a generic method to
construct provably secure single-server C2C-PAKE protocol. However, Wang and
Hu [10] found their scheme suﬀer from undetectable on-line dictionary attacks, and
they introduced a new eﬃcient generic construction scheme for the 3-party PAKE
protocols. In this paper, based on Wang-Hu’s scheme we presented a new generic
construction for the cross-realm C2C-PAKE protocols which is not only eﬃcient but
also resistant to both oﬀ-line and undetectable on-line dictionary attacks. Moreover,
we prove its security in Abdalla et al.’s Real-or-Random(ROR) model [9].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our generic con-
struction for the cross-realm C2C-PAKE protocols. To prove its security, in Section
3, we recall the ROR model, necessary basic assumptions and the deﬁnition of secu-
rity. In Section 4, we focus on the security of the new scheme and provides details
of the security proof. Finally, concluding remarks are given in Section 5.
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2 General Construction of C2C-PAKE Protocols
In this section, we present a generic construction for client-to-client password-based
key exchange protocols (referred as C2C-GPAKE) in the scenario in which we have
an honest-but-curious server. The construction could be viewed as an extension
of the scheme proposed in [10], which in turn is an enhancing of Abdalla et al.’s
generic construction[9] which is designed for 3-party PAKE. More precisely, we ex-
tend Wang-Hu’s scheme to two separate servers, and present the construction using
a 2-party password-based key exchange and a 2-party MAC-based key exchange
protocol. Similarly to the construction of Abdalla et al., the proposed scheme is
essentially a form of compiler transforming any secure 2-party PAKE protocol into
a secure C2C-PAKE protocol, and thus can be used to create a series of provably
secure C2C-PAKE protocols.
2.1 Scheme Description
The general construction involves in four participants, denoted as A, S1, B and S2,
respectively, where A is a client in the realm of server S1, B is a client in the realm
of server S2. We assume that the key K is pre-distributed between S1 and S2 by
using a two party key exchange protocol. The detailed steps of the C2C-GPAKE,
as shown in Figure 1, are described as follows:
A(pwA) S1(pwA) S2(pwB) B(pwB)
2PAKE(skA)⇐⇒ 2PAKE(skB)⇐⇒
ga,MACskA (g
a,A,B)−−−−−−−−−−−→ g
b,MACskB (g
b,B,A)←−−−−−−−−−−−
ga,MACK(g
a,A,B)−−−−−−−−−→
gb,MACK(g
b,B,A)←−−−−−−−−−
gb,MACskA (g
b,B,A)←−−−−−−−−−−− g
a,MACskB (g
a,A,B)−−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 1. C2C-GPAKE: a generic client-to-client password-based key exchange
• Step 1: The users A and B establish two secure high-entropy session keys skA
and skB with the trusted server S1 and S2, respectively, by using any semantic
secure 2-party PAKE protocol.
• Step 2: Using the session keys skA and skB generated in the ﬁrst step as the MAC
key, A and B can concurrently authenticate and send their respective temporary
Diﬃe-Hellman public keys to their own server S1 and S2, respectively.
• Step 3: Upon receiving and conﬁrming the temporary public key from the client
A, the server S1 authenticates and transfers a temporary public key of A to S2 by
using the MAC scheme with the symmetrical key K between S1 and S2. Similarly,
the server S2 authenticates and transfers a temporary public key of B to S1 in
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the same way.
• Step 4: Finally, S1 and S2 send the temporary public keys of B and A to A and B,
respectively. In this manner, A and B establish a session key in an authenticated
way, with the cooperation of the trusted servers S1 and S2.
3 Formal Models for Cross-Realm C2C-PAKE Protocol
The ﬁrst security model about key exchange protocol was proposed by Bellare and
Rogaway in [11]. After that, Bellare et al. extended their model to password-based
key exchange protocol [12] in 2000. Recently, Abdalla et al. provided a new and
stronger security model [9] by modifying the previous one [12] slightly and called it
Real-or-Random (ROR) model. They suggested to use the ROR model for proving
the security of their password-based schemes. In this section, we utilize this formal
model to prove the security of our generic construction for our cross-realm client-
to-client password-based key exchange.
3.1 Communication Model
We denote A, B as two clients belonging to two diﬀerent realms. Client A shares his
password pwA with server S1, and client B shares his password pwB with another
server S2. S1 and S2 share the common key K which is pre-distributed between
them by using a 2-party key exchange protocol. All clients’ passwords are chosen
from the same small dictionary D whose distribution is Dpw.
The generic construction of cross-realm C2C-PAKE is an interactive scheme
among four participants’ instances: Ai, Bj , Ss1, S
t
2. In the end, A
i and Bj establish
a session key sk. In the model, it is assumed that an adversary A has full control
over the communication channels and can create several concurrent instances of
the protocol. During the execution of the protocol, adversary A interacts with
participants only via oracle queries, which model adversary’s possible attacks in the
real execution. All possible oracle queries are listed in the following, where U i (Sj ,
respectively) denotes the i-th (j-th, respectively) instance of a participant U (S,
respectively):
• Execute(Ai, Bj , Ss1, St2): This query models passive attacks in which the at-
tacker eavesdrops on honest executions. The output of this query consists of the
messages that were exchanged during the honest execution of the protocol.
• SendClient(U i, m): This query models an active attack. After querying the
oracle, a message m is sent to the client instance U i. Finally, client instance U i
forwards its response to A.
• SendServer(Si, m): This query models an active attack against a server. It out-
puts the message that server instance Si would generate upon receipt of message
m.
• Test(U i): If a Test query is asked to a client instance that has not accepted,
then return the undeﬁned ⊥. If a Test query is asked to an instance of an honest
Z. Li et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 212 (2008) 257–268260
client whose intended partner is dishonest or to an instance of a dishonest client,
then returns the real session key. Otherwise, returns either the real session key
if b = 1 or a random one if b = 0, where b is the hidden bit selected at random
prior to the ﬁrst call.
Partnering: The deﬁnition of partnering uses the session identiﬁcations(sid).
More speciﬁcally, two instances U i and U j are said to be partners if the following
conditions are satisﬁed:
(1) Both U i and U j accept;
(2) Both U i and U j own the same sid;
(3) U i is U j ’s partner and vice-verse; and
(4) No instance other than U i and U j accepts with a partner identity equal to
U i or U j .
Freshness. An instance U i is said to be fresh if it has accepted and no Reveal
queries have been made to it or its partner.
3.2 Building Blocks
In our generic construction for the client-to-client PAKE protocols, two crypto-
graphic primitives are used as building blocks: decisional Diﬃe-Hellman assumption
and message authentication codes.
Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman assumption: DDH. The DDH assumption can
be precisely deﬁned by two experiments, Expddh−real
G
(A) and Expddh−rand
G
(A). An
adversary A is provided with gx, gy and gxy in the former experiment, and gx, gy
and gz in the latter one, where x, y and z are drawn at random from {1, ..., G}.
Deﬁne the advantage of A in violating the DDH assumption as follows:
Advddh
G
(t) = max{|Pr[Expddh−real
G
(A) = 1]− Pr[Expddh−rand
G
(A) = 1]|}.
where the maximum is over all adversaries A running in time at most t. The DDH
assumption in G holds if Advddh
G
(t) is a negligible function of t.
Message authentication codes. A message authentication code scheme
MAC=(Key,Tag,Ver) is composed of a MAC key generation algorithm Key, a MAC
generation algorithm Tag and a MAC veriﬁcation algorithm Ver. A secure MAC
should prevent existential forgeries under chosen-message attacks(EUF-CMA) if ad-
versaries has access to the generation and veriﬁcation oracles. That is, it can not
create a new valid message-tag pair, even after obtaining many valid message-tag
pairs. The maximal value of the advantage Adveuf−cmaMAC (A) with at most t time
complexity and at most qg and qv queries to its MAC generation and veriﬁcation
oracles, respectively, is a negligible function of the parameters above.
3.3 Security Deﬁnition
According to [7], a secure generic construction of cross-realm C2C-PAKE should
satisfy the following security requirements: (1) The session key cannot be distin-
guished from a random number by an adversary; (2) The servers do not know the
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session key between clients; (3) The client can authenticate his server and vice-verse;
(4) The client does not know other client’s password; and (5) Clients’ passwords are
not revealed to other servers except for their own servers. We deﬁne the following
security notions:
Semantic Security in the ROR model: During the executing, the adversary
A is allowed to send multiple queries to the Execute, SendClient, SendServer, and
Test oracles as it wants, while it is no longer allowed to ask Reveal queries which is
allowed in the model of Abdalla et al. [9]. Notice that, when b=0, the same random
key value should be returned for Test queries that are asked to two instances which
are partnered.
We say the adversary A succeeds if he correctly guesses the bit b hidden in the
Test oracle. Let Succ denote the event that A succeeds. Provided that passwords
are drawn from dictionary D, we deﬁne the advantage of A as:
Advror−akeP,D (A) = 2 · Pr[Succ]− 1,
Advror−akeP,D (t, R) = max{Advror−akeP,D (A)},
where the maximum is over all adversaries with time-complexity at most t and using
at most R times oracle queries.
The scheme of C2C-GPAKE is said to be semantically secure if the advantage
Advror−akeP,D (t, R) is only negligibly larger than kn/|D|, where n is number of active
sessions and k is a constant.
Key Privacy with respect to the server: This security requires no infor-
mation about the session key revealed to the server who knows all passwords of
his members but behaves in an honest-but-curious manner. The adversary A has
access to all the passwords. To capture the adversary’s ability to tell apart the real
session key shared between any two instances from a random one, Abdalla et al.[9]
introduced a new type of oracle, called TestPair, deﬁned as follows, where b is a
bit chosen uniformly at random at the beginning of the experiment.
TestPair(Ai, Bj): If client instances Ai and Bj do not share the same key, then
return the undeﬁned symbol ⊥. Otherwise, return the real session key shared be-
tween Ai and Bj if b=1 or a random key of the same size if b=0.
During the executing, the adversary A has access to the passwords of all users
and multiple queries to the Execute, SendClient and TestPair oracles as it wants,
and let b0 be its output. Such an adversary is said to win the experiment if b0 = b,
where b is the hidden bit used by the TestPair oracle. Let Succ denote the event
in which the adversary guesses b correctly. We can then deﬁne the kp-advantage
Advkp−akeP,D (A) of A in violating the key privacy of the key exchange protocol P and
the advantage function AdvkpD (t, R) of P as in previous deﬁnitions.
Finally, we say an adversary A succeeds in breaking the key privacy of a protocol
P if its advantage Advkp−akeP,D (A) is non-negligible.
Authentication Security: Most of the existing password-based authenticated
key exchange protocols are vulnerable to the undetectable on-line dictionary at-
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tacks due to the absence of authentication of messages between the client and the
server. In order to solve this problem, we introduce the deﬁnition of the unilat-
eral authentication from the client to the trusted server as [10] does. We denote
by Succauth(c→s)P (A) the probability that an adversary A successfully impersonates
a client instance during executing the protocol P while the trusted server does
not detect it. Further, Succauth(c→s)P (A) = max{Advauth(c→s)P (A)} is deﬁned as
the maximum over all A running in time at most t and using resources at most
R. We say a scheme of C2C-GPAKE is client-to-server authentication secure if
Succ
auth(c→s)
P (t, R) is negligible in the security parameter.
Password Protection Against Malicious Client: The malicious client C
succeeds if he successfully learns another client’s password. Since Test oracle query
is used to deﬁne the session key’s security, the malicious client does not have access
to Test query. Let D be user’s password dictionary. For any malicious client C,
deﬁne his advantage Succpw−mcD as
Advpw−mcD (C) = Pr[Succ
pw−mc],
Advpw−mcD (t, R) = max{Advpw−mcD (C)},
where the maximum is over all adversaries with time-complexity at most t and
querying oracles at most R times. We say P satisﬁes password protection against
malicious client if the advantage Advpw−mc is only negligibly larger than O(qs)·Dpw,
where qs is the number of all send queries, Dpw is the distribution of password
dictionary.
Password Protection Against Honest-but-Curious Server: An honest-
but-curious server S succeeds if he successfully learns the passwords of the clients
which belongs to other servers. For any honest-but-curious server S, we deﬁne his
advantage Advpw−msD (S) as
Advpw−msD (S) = Pr[Succ
pw−ms],
Advpw−msD (t, R) = max{Advpw−msD (S)},
where the maximum is over all adversaries with time-complexity at most t and
querying oracles at most R times.
We say P satisﬁes password protection against malicious server if the advantage
Advpw−ms is only negligibly larger than O(qs) · Dpw, where qs is the number of all
send queries, Dpw is the distribution of password dictionary.
4 Security proof
In this section, we examine all security requirements proposed in the subsection 3.2
and show they are all met.
Semantic Security in the ROR model. As the following theorem states,
the generic scheme C2C-GPAKE is a secure client-to-client password-based key
exchange protocol as long as the Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman assumption holds in G
and the underlying primitives it uses are secure.
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Theorem 4.1 Let 2PAKE be a semantic secure 2-party PAKE protocol and MAC
be a secure MAC algorithm. Let qexe and qtest denote the numbers of queries to
Execute and Test oracles, and qAsend, q
B
send, and qake be the numbers of queries to
the SendClient and SendServer oracles with respect to each of the two 2PAKE
protocols and the MAC-based authenticated key exchange protocols. Then,
Advror−akeC2C−GPAKE,D(t, qexe, qtest, q
A
send, q
B
send, qake)
≤ 2 ·Advror−ake2PAKE,D(t, qexe, qexe + qAsend, qAsend)
+2 ·Advror−ake2PAKE,D(t, qexe, qexe + qBsend, qBsend)
+2 · qake ·Adveuf−cmaMAC (t, 2, 0)
+2 ·Advddh
G
(t + 8(qexe + qake) · τG)
where τG denotes the exponentiation computational time in G.
Proof. We follow the proof of Wang-Hu, which in turn is of Abdalla et al.[9].
Without loss of generality, we assume the set of honest users contains only users A
and B. It can be easily extended to the more general case. Let A be an adversary
against the semantic security of C2C-GPAKE in the Real-or-Random model with
time-complexity at most t, and asking at most qexe queries to its Execute oracle,
qtest queries to its Test oracle, qAsend, q
B
send queries to SendClient and SendServer
oracles corresponding to the 2PAKE protocol between A and the trusted server S1,
and between B and the trusted server S2, respectively. qASake queries to SendClient
and SendSever oracles corresponding to the authenticated key exchange protocol
between A and S1, and qBSake queries to the oracles corresponding to the protocol
between B and S2. Our proof consists of a sequence of hybrid experiments, starting
with the real attack against C2C-GPAKE scheme and ending in a game in which the
adversary’s advantage is 0. For each game Gi, deﬁne an event Succi corresponding
to the case in which the adversary correctly guesses the hidden bit b involved in the
Test queries in game Gi.
Game G0. This game corresponds to the real attack. By deﬁnition, we have
Advror−akeC2C−GPAKE,D(A) = 2 · Pr[Succ0]− 1.
Game G1. We now modify the simulation of the oracles as the proof of Wang-
Hu which uses a random session key sk′A, instead of the session key skA, as the
MAC key in all of the sessions between A and S1. So, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 4.2 |Pr[Succ1]− Pr[Succ0]| ≤ 2 ·Advror−ake2PAKE,D(t, qexe, qexe + qAsend, qAsend).
Game G2. This game is the same as the previous one except that we replace
the session key skB with a random session key sk′B in all of the sessions between B
and S2. So, we have the similar argument:
Lemma 4.3 |Pr[Succ2]− Pr[Succ1]| ≤ 2 ·Advror−ake2PAKE,D(t, qexe, qexe + qBsend, qBsend).
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Game G3. In this game, we use a random key K ′, instead of the key K in all
of the sessions between S1 and S2. In fact, since K is pre-distributed between S1
and S2 by using two party key exchange protocol, we can view it as a random and
independent value, so this game is equivalent to the previous one. Thus, we have
Pr[Succ3] = Pr[Succ2].
Game G4. This game is modiﬁed as follows. If the adversary asks a SendClient
or SendServer query for AKE between A and S1 involving a new pair of message
tag not previously generated by an oracle, then we consider the MAC tag invalid
and abort the game. So we have the following arguments:
Lemma 4.4 |Pr[Succ4]− Pr[Succ3]| ≤ qASake ·Adveuf−cmaMAC (t, 2, 0).
Game G5. This game is the same as the previous one except that the adversary
asks a SendClient or SendServer query for AKE between B and S2. Hence
Lemma 4.5 |Pr[Succ5]− Pr[Succ4]| ≤ qBSake ·Adveuf−cmaMAC (t, 2, 0).
The following two games G6 and G7 is the same as the last two games of proof
of Wang-Hu. So we have the following two conclusions:
Pr[Succ6] = Pr[Succ5] and
Lemma 4.6 |Pr[Succ7]− Pr[Succ6]| ≤ AdvddhG (t+ 8(qexe + qake)τG), where qake =
qASake + q
BS
ake.
Since no information on the bit b in the Test oracle is leaked to the adversary,
Pr[Succ7] = 1/2. This result combined with the previous lemmas yields the result
in Theorem 4.1. 
Key Privacy respect to Server: An honest-but-curious server only has access
to Sendclient, Execute and Testpair oracles. As the following theorem states, the
generic scheme C2C-GPAKE has key privacy with respect to the server as long as
the DDH assumption holds in G.
Theorem 4.7 In our cross-realm C2C-GPAKE protocol, an honest-but-curious
server cannot learn the session key between clients as long as the DDH assump-
tion holds in the group G. Formally,
Advkp−akeC2C−GPAKE,D(t, qexe, qtest, q
A
send, q
B
send, qake) ≤ 2 ·AdvddhG (t + 8(qexe + qake) · τe)
where the parameters are deﬁned as in Theorem 4.1.
Proof. The proof is similar to the games G6 and G7 in the proof of semantic security
of C2C-GPAKE. Let Akp be an adversary against the key privacy of C2C-GPAKE
whose time-complexity is at most t. Moreover, Akp asks at most qexe queries to
its Execute oracle, qtest queries to its TestPair oracle, qASake queries to SendClient
and SendSever oracles corresponding to the authenticated key exchange protocol
between A and S1, and qBSake queries to the oracles corresponding to the protocol
between B and S2. We show that if Akp exists, we can construct an adversary Addh
to solve the DDH problem with non-negligible probability.
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Given an instance of the DDH problem (X,Y, Z), Addh ﬁrst chooses the pass-
words for all users according to the distribution of D, then it chooses a bit b at
random used in the TestPair oracle. Now it starts running Akp giving the pre-
distributed key K and all the passwords of all users to it. Since Addh knows the
password of all users, it can easily answer queries made by Akp. To deal with the
security of the key privacy respect to server, we only consider the last ﬂows of
C2C-GPAKE. Like Abdalla’s et al.[9] proof, here we introduce the input triple in
the answers to SendClient, Execute, and TestPair queries by using the classical
random self-reducibility of the Diﬃe-Hellman problem.
We simulate the Execute oracle by using the passwords that have been chosen
and SendClient queries, and simulate the SendClient and TestPair as follows:
R1: When a SendClient(Ai, Start) query is asked, Addh picks two random
values a0 and x0 in Zq, computes X0 = Xa0gx0 and stores them in a list ΛA.
For SendClient(Bj , Start) in the same session, the simulator selects b0 and y0,
computers Y0 and stores them in a list ΛB in the same measure.
R2: Upon receipt of both SendClient(Ai, (Y0,mb)) and
SendClient(Bj , (X0,ma)) of the same session, the simulator checks the exis-
tence of X0 and Y0 by using ΛA and ΛB, respectively. If their existence is exact,
it computes Z0 = Za0b0 × Y x0b0 × Xa0y0 × gx0y0 in preparation for answering the
TestPair query. Otherwise, it proceeds with the simulation as it would in a real
attack.
R3: When a TestPair(U i1, U
j
2 ) query is asked, Addh ﬁrst checks whether U i1 and
U j2 have both accepted and have the same key. If the check fails, then Addh returns
⊥. If the check passes, then Addh knows the corresponding value Z0 for the secret
key and can answer it based on the hidden bit b it had previously chosen.
Let b0 be the output of Akp. If b0 = b, then Addh returns 1 and 0, otherwise.
As analyzed as the game G6 of the proof of Wang-Hu, we have the result of
Theorem 4.7. 
Authentication security: This security aims to resist the undetectable on-
line dictionary attacks which stem from an absence of authentication of messages
between the client and the server, so it has nothing to do with the messages be-
tween the servers. From this viewpoint, we can treat S1 and S2 as a single server.
According to the games from G0 to G5, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 4.8 The cross-realm C2C-GPAKE satisﬁes the client-to-server authen-
tication security as long as the DDH assumption holds in G and the underlying
primitives it uses are secure. Formally,
Adv
auth(C→S)
C2C−GPAKE,D(t, qexe, qtest, q
A
send, q
B
send, qake)
≤ Advror−ake2PAKE,D(t, qexe, qexe + qAsend, qAsend)
+Advror−ake2PAKE,D(t, qexe, qexe + q
B
send, q
B
send)
+qake ·Adveuf−cmaMAC (t, 2, 0)
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where the parameters are deﬁned as in Theorem 4.1.
Password Protection Against Malicious Client: In the cross-realm C2C-
GPAKE protocol, a malicious client may want to learn other client’s password. In
our protocol, we suppose client B is malicious and his goal is to learn client A’s
password pwA. This security notion is ensured by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.9 In our cross-realm C2C-GPAKE scheme, the malicious client B
cannot learn the client A’s password as long as our cross-realm C2C-GPAKE sat-
isﬁes the client-to-server authentication security. Formally,
Advpw−mcC2C−GPAKE,D(t, qexe, qtest, q
A
send, q
B
send, qake)
≤ Advror−ake2PAKE,D(t, qexe, qexe + qAsend, qAsend)
+Advror−ake2PAKE,D(t, qexe, qexe + q
B
send, q
B
send)
+qake ·Adveuf−cmaMAC (t, 2, 0) + (qAsend + qBsend + qake)/N
where the parameters are deﬁned as in Theorem 4.1.
Proof. Since the C2C-GPAKE satisﬁes the client-to-server authentication security,
it can resist undetectable on-line dictionary attacks. Moreover, from the execution of
the protocol, since a is a random number and the 2PAKE is secure, so the malicious
client B thinks the values of ga and MAC(ga, skA, A,B) are two independent ran-
dom numbers from which no information about pwA is revealed to him. As a result,
the probability that client B correctly guesses pwA is exactly qs/N after qs times
send queries, where N is the size of the dictionary and qs = qAsend + q
B
send + qake. 
Password Protection Against Malicious Server: In our protocol, we sup-
pose S2 is malicious and his goal is to learn client A’s password pwA. This theorem’s
proof is similar to that of Theorem 4.9.
Theorem 4.10 In our cross-realm C2C-GPAKE protocol, the malicious server S2
cannot learn the client A’s password. Formally,
Advpw−msC2C−GPAKE,D(t, qexe, qtest, q
A
send, q
B
send, qake)
≤ Advror−ake2PAKE,D(t, qexe, qexe + qAsend, qAsend)
+Advror−ake2PAKE,D(t, qexe, qexe + q
B
send, q
B
send)
+qake ·Adveuf−cmaMAC (t, 2, 0) + (qAsend + qBsend + qake)/N
where the parameters are deﬁned as in Theorem 4.1.
5 Conclusion
Some generic constructions for 3-party PAKE protocols [9,10] were proposed re-
cently, but they do not accommodate client-to-client PAKE. Byun et.al [6] suggested
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to design a generic construction of C2C-PAKE in the cross-realm setting by using
2-party PAKE and key distribution protocols, but they were not able to provide
a scheme. In this paper, we present a general construction for the client-to-client
PAKE protocols based on the generic construction for 3-party scenario. Moreover,
we are able to prove its security by using the existing eﬃcient protocols based on
standard assumption instead of the random oracle models.
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